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Based on the review of literature and our own conceptual considerations, we show that 
absorption problems regarding the EU Structural Funds may be important. Our brief covering 
of some general macroeconomic aspects of absorption problems brings us closer to the central 
topic of our paper, namely, the question of how to measure the administrative capacities of 
particular Candidate Countries for Structural Funds. First, we describe a suitable 
methodology for calculating the administrative absorption capacities of Candidate Countries. 
We then turn to some of the Candidate Countries’ institution-building activities in preparation 
for the EU’s Structural Policy. This shows that the process of preparing programming 
documents was the central point of the overall institution-building exercise. At the end of this 
chapter we present calculations on administrative capacities in five Candidate Countries: the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia, respectively. These calculations 
are based on previous calculations by the European Commission and on the strategic 
documents negotiated between the Commission and these Candidate Countries before the end 
of 2003. By calculating the key indicators of administrative capacity, we offer some 
preliminary statements regarding the present administrative capacity in a particular 
prospective new Member State and provide additional information on the overall absorption 
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There are views supported by the European Commission (see European Commission, 1996; 2001a) 
saying Structural Policy in the EU should speed up the convergence process between the more and the 
less developed countries and regions. These ideas are mainly based on the theories of endogenous 
growth (see e.g. Romer, 1986;  Lucas,  1988;  Grossman/Helpman,  1991) and, therefore, human 
resources and institutions dealing with management, programming and implementation of EU grants 
in the recipient countries are very important.  
 
We will show in this paper that economic theory has not seen much research on the topic of absorption 
of foreign transfers2. Therefore, we devote our core attention to this aspect, especially to the 
administrative absorption capacity. We concentrate on Accession Countries from the viewpoint of the 
processes necessary for improving administrative preparedness for the EU’s Structural Policy. In the 
process, we try to make some conclusions/speculations regarding possibilities of successful or 
unsuccessful Structural Fund implementation in economically less developed areas of certain 
Candidate Countries in the 2004-2006 period.  
 
Here we point out that there is great ongoing pressure for the new Member States to adopt rules and 
practices in a very short time. The rules and practices of today’s Structural Funds have developed 
since the end of the 1980s, giving Member States over ten years to adjust their systems of structural 
(or development) policies to the EU’s gradual system reforms. Today, we can speak of almost 
‘optimal’ – albeit still different – systems of managing Structural and Cohesion Funds in each Member 
State. In addition, Candidate Countries have had to adopt the same implementation system Cohesion 
Countries used to have but the new Member States received much fewer per capita funds in 2004-
2006. Consequently, this means these funds are to be accompanied by higher administrative costs per 
unit. Therefore, it is even more important to administer these grants as efficiently as possible in these 
countries. 
 
We are fully aware of the complexity of the questions that motivated us to prepare this paper. These 
questions seek answers far beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, to a great extent we will 
concentrate our research here on indicating the potential absorption problems of new Member States, 
in particular indicating their administrative absorption capacities for managing Structural Funds in the 
2004-2006 period. 
 
In the first part of this paper we will briefly present literature on absorption issues, some possible 
definitions of absorption capacity and will define programming principle as the most important for the 
institution building when dealing with the administrative absorption capacities in the pre-accession 
period. 
After describing the framework, in the second part, we will present the administrative absorption 
concept as developed for the Candidate Countries. Moreover, such a concept could be of use also for 
the EU Member States. Based on the concept developed by the EU Commission for the 10 Candidate 
Countries, we will present the country analysis in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia and 
                                                 
2 Here, we note that we are concentrating our study on the question of absorption capacities for Structural Funds 
of the EU. Hence, we will not discuss the literature and problems of the development literature dealing with 
bilateral and multilateral aid to development countries. For recent studies dealing with this topic see, for 
example, Collier/Dollar (2002), Ram (2003).    4
Slovenia, respectively. The main questions here will be, (1) how to ex-ante measure the administrative 
absorption capacity in the new Member States and (2) what is the level of preparedness for the EU 
Structural Funds implementation in these countries.  
At the end some conclusions will be driven. 
 
Enlargement, institution building and absorption literature 
 
In process of actively preparing for accession, each CEEC had to consider varying options when 
introducing the EU’s Structural Policy and in introducing related new institutions into the domestic 
economic and policy environment. The options chosen caused – and still are causing – external shocks 
bringing positive and negative consequences for the whole society. By preparing programming 
documents such as National Development Plans and Community Support Frameworks or Single 
Programming Documents, deriving from the EU’s Structural Funds regulation3, both formal and 
informal institutions have had either to adapt to the new circumstances by taking on additional tasks or 
to be replaced by newly established institutions. Therefore, the task of preparing new strategic 
documents should be also seen from the viewpoint where institutions are permanently in a process of 
transition. This applies to institutions of the central government, the social partners, non-governmental 
organisations, and for institutions at regional and local levels.  
 
According to the General Regulations, each Member State has to fulfil certain requirements before it 
can take part in the EU’s Structural and Cohesion policy. Each country’s government must – inter alia 
– decide which ministry will take on the leading role in Structural and Cohesion Fund management, 
who will be responsible for the execution of programmes and financial execution and control, how the 
national cofinancing of the EU’s development programmes will be assured (also involving direct links 
with respective national budgets – the question of matching funds), how the monitoring process will 
be dealt with regarding partnership aspects, and whether project pipelines for different programmes 
are working etc.  
 
Literature on absorption phenomena 
 
A review of academic and EU-internal literature indicates the absence of a conceptual framework to 
comprehensively assess the issue of absorption problems relating to Structural Funds. Therefore, we 
must look at literature on absorption problems in fields such as development economics and public 
choice. Further, the topic of how to manage Structural Funds is quite rarely described in academic 
literature.  
 
What might explain this relatively low interest in this topic from both the European Commission and 
the academic world? Of course we can only speculate, but one reason may be that the EU’s Structural 
Policy is a relatively new field for investigation4. After the reform in 1988, the first programming 
period started in 1989 and lasted up until 1993 and we are now experiencing the third programming 
period of 2000-2006.  
 
                                                 
3 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the 
Structural Funds, Official Journal of the European Communities. 
4 In a recent volume by the World Bank (see Funck/Pizzati, 2003: 7) the authors confirmed the fact that only 
since the late 1980s have the Structural Funds had an efficiency-oriented design. Because supply-side effects 
take time to materialise, it is too early to assess the impact of Structural Funds on long-term convergence. The 
situation of measuring the influence of absorption problems is even much worse since the various phenomena as 
such are only being discussed and potential indicators being constructed to measure them. This paper also hopes 
to make a modest contribution to these efforts.    5
In our paper we briefly describe the main phenomena related to absorption problems, however, our 
main topic focuses on administrative absorption of Structural Funds, especially in new Member States. 
Here, relevant materials for paper were very scarce in both quantity and quality terms. According to 
our information, the first studies on this topic were only made in 1997 for Member States taking into 
account research from other fields of economics such as development economics, institutional 
economics, economics of organisations and similar. Only after 2000 did the European Commission 
also start to commission studies for the Candidate Countries. 
 
The EU’s Structural Policy is still a ‘work in progress’ and is further developing with every 
programming period. Reflecting these developments, this topic is becoming ever more interesting for 
the academic world.5 
 
Short overview of studies and evaluations 
Different literature sources deal with absorption capacity. We can find two groups: (1) 
macroeconomic analysis, such as by Herve/Holzmann (1997)6; and (2) different evaluation studies 
and reports prepared and published by the European Commission or by consultants working in charge 
of the Commission. Most sources used in this study will be described in the relevant chapters of the 
paper, therefore we will only provide a short overview here. 
 
One of the first EU studies to theoretically and empirically investigate definitional and measurement 
of absorption problems was made in 1997 by Hervé and Holzmann. The authors took quite a strict 
economist’s approach when reviewing and assessing the academic literature and empirical evidence 
with regard to the capacity of economically less developed regions or countries to productively absorb 
large-scale transfers. Since no previous study had been made they could only link their review to 
existing literature in fields such as development economics and public choice. This study, therefore, 
deals with economic aspects of absorption problems in general and also seeks to find some empirical 
evidence in EU Structural Policies.  
 
The European Commission a range of evaluations7 and reports8 presenting the effects of the EU’s 
Structural Policies in Member States and abroad. These reports should reveal whether the main goal of 
Structural Policy, that is, economic and social cohesion and real convergence between Member States 
and their regions, is taking place as a result of this policy.  
 
However, none of these reports on the progress of Structural Policy also deals with absorption capacity 
questions in Member States or Candidate Countries. However, in the framework of the Third Cohesion 
Report some studies have been prepared where also issues of absorption has been tackled (see ÖIR, 
2003). The study by ÖIR asked questions about the impact the implementation process has on the 
achievement of results. Additionally, the Commission’s Services very recently produced a report on 
the management of Structural Funds in Member States, however, it mainly concentrated on the 
European Regional Development Fund (see European Commission, 2003a). 
 
Here, we should also mention the Regular Reports (1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002) the Commission 
has published since 1998 in order to make annual checks of Candidate Countries’ fulfilment of the 
                                                 
5 See, for example, recent books published by the Austrian National Bank (Tumpel-Gugerell/Mooslechner, 
2003) and the World Bank (Funck/Pizzati, 2003), where the latter also explicitly deals with institutional 
arrangements and future structural funds management in the new Member States. 
6 Here, reference is made to the study done for the European Commission. For a book version of this study, see 
Herve/Holzmann (1998). 
7 See, for example, Bradley/Barry (1999); Bradley/Undiedt (2000); Bradley et al. (2001); Beutel (2002), 
CSES (2003). 
8 See European Commission (1996, 1998, 2000a, 2001, 2001a)    6
accession criteria. There, one can also find general chapters dealing with the absorption capacities of 
these countries, however, they contain no quantitative or qualitative analyses.  
 
A set of studies commissioned by the European Commission was prepared in 2002 (NEI, 2002a, 
2002b, 2002c). Based on the country studies (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, East Germany’s Länder) and 
sectoral studies (Management, Programming, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Financial 
Management and Control), a set of key indicators, benchmarks and baseline indicators for Candidate 
Countries to effectively manage the Structural Funds were defined. The studies focused mainly on the 
institutional set-ups and administrative resources required to manage Structural Funds in these three 
Member States and East Germany’s Länder.9  
 
At the beginning of 2003, the European Commission published studies where key indicators described 
in the studies above were tested in ten CEEC Candidate Countries. Eight of the ten countries studied 
are expected to become EU members in 2004 and the remaining two countries (Bulgaria and Romania) 
after 2006 (Papadopoulos, 2003, 2003a)10. Here, country studies were prepared to identify the needs 
for further institution-building and to ameliorate the countries’ capacity to absorb EU funds upon 
accession. The results reveal surprisingly poor levels of administrative capacity in eight new Member 
States. According to these studies, accession in the area of Structural Funds is not only too early for 
the Candidate Countries that were excluded from accession in 2004, such as Bulgaria and Romania, 
but also for the CEECs that became EU Member States in May 2004. We will examine and discuss in 
this paper some of these results for administrative capacity in Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Estonia and Slovenia. 
 
Most relevant studies on absorption capacity described in our paper were developed in framework of 
the institution-building part of Phare programmes in the Candidate Countries. A general framework 
regarding absorption capacity issues was briefly described there and country studies from cohesion 
Member States such as Ireland, Spain, and Portugal were compared with the existing systems in 
Candidate Countries such as Hungary (Pires, 2001) and Slovenia (NEI, 2002). As a result, 
recommendations for restructuring or reorganising the system were provided with the main objective 
to adapt each country’s Structural Policies in line with the EU’s Structural Policies. These studies were 
produced in the framework of Phare’s ‘Special Preparatory Programme for Structural Funds’ executed 
in Candidate Countries separately (see e.g. Slovenia SPP-TA, 2002).  
 
The most valuable document that was used for the purpose of this paper is Questionnaire regarding 
negotiating Chapter 21 - Structural and Regional Policy (see European Commission, 2003c, and 
2003c  Annex). There, the Commission prepared a set of questions regarding the necessary 
institutional arrangements for administrating the Structural Funds and distributed them to Candidate 
Countries for their completion.  
 
The review of literature and own conceptual considerations indicate that absorption problems 
regarding the EU’s Structural Funds may well be important. This might not be in contradiction with 
the general opinion – as well as other empirical findings – concluding that the macroeconomic effects 
of Structural Funds have been highly beneficial. The conclusion is simply that, without absorption 
problems, the EU’s Structural Policy would be even more beneficial regarding economic and social 
cohesion in the EU.  
 
 
                                                 
9 However, the absorption capacities of these countries were not measured explicitly, but only different structural 
funds management systems were described in detail. The full awareness of the differences between the countries 
studied has been taken into consideration and the key indicators for the Candidate Countries developed. In our 
paper, we used the results of these studies as the basis for our research and further development of indicators for 
successfully managing Structural Funds.  
10 Out of 10 candidate countries, Malta and Cyprus were not included in this analysis, but Bulgaria and Romania 
were however analysed.   7
 
Institutional factors and definitions of absorption capacity 
 
The importance of absorption problems depends mostly on institutional factors, both at the EU and 
national levels. Institutional factors at the EU level are largely related to the European Commission 
and its services. Important factors are, for example: transparency of the allocation process of Structural 
Funds, and coherence in the use of different funds. Bauer ( 2001; 14-15) also stresses typical 
administrative factors such as: problems of an overburdened administration and a lack of internal 
vertical communication and horizontal co-ordination which reduce the Commission’s organisational 
abilities.  
Institutional factors at the national level are related to the real structure of the economy, wage-setting 
institutions, administrative capacity and capability, organisation of the political system (federal vs. 
central) and economic policies. Consequently, where a similar amount of transfers is involved 
absorption problems are likely to vary in importance from country to country. The national factors can 
be influenced by the Commission only with small leverage and are linked to the requirements of the 
Structural Funds’ General Regulations.  
 
In relation to the EU’s Structural Funds absorption issues can be summarised around three specific 
definitions of absorption capacity (NEI, 2002): 
1.  Macroeconomic absorption capacity, which can be defined and measured in terms of GDP levels 
to Structural Funds allocated. Here, we should look at the total outcome of the negotiations stated 
in three so-called ‘financial negotiating chapters’11 in December 2002 in Copenhagen (see 
Copenhagen, 2002). At the European Summit in Berlin12 the upper limit for the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds was generally set at 4 percent of the GDP of the respective Member State.  
2.  Administrative absorption capacity, which can be defined as the ability and skills of central, 
regional and local authorities to prepare acceptable plans, programmes, and projects in due time, 
to decide on programmes and projects, to arrange co-ordination among the principal partners, to 
cope with the vast amount of administrative and reporting work required by the Commission, and 
to finance and supervise implementation properly, avoiding fraud as far as possible. 
3.  Financial absorption capacity, which means the ability to co-finance EU-supported programmes 
and projects, to plan and guarantee these national contributions in multi-annual budgets, and to 
collect these contributions from several partners (public and private), interested in a programme 
or project. 
 
All three definitions can – more or less – be studied with the help of existing programming documents 
as well as evaluation studies in both “old” and “new” Member States. For old Member States, we 
could find information for all three definitions of absorption capacity in national programming 
documents as well as in evaluation studies committed by the Commission. Unfortunately, no 
comprehensive studies of all three aspects have been carried out. 
Documents for consideration when dealing with the absorption capacities of new Member States can 
only be useful for macroeconomic and administrative absorption capacity, but not financial 
absorption. Financial absorption of Structural Funds in a country or region can only be evaluated ex-
post. Therefore, for new Member States we can only examine the pre-accession funds.  
 
Before turning our attention to administrative absorption problems, we would like to present some 
crucial points that are important for institutional arrangements when implementing EU Structural 
Funds as well as the institutional arrangements in the pre-accession period.  
                                                 
11 So-called ‘financial chapters’ concern: (1) Agriculture (Common Agricultural Policy); (2) Structural Policy 
(Structural and Cohesion Funds); and (3) Financial obligations of a particular country to the EU budget. 
However, other budget items are also devoted to Member States, such as Internal Affairs (e.g. allocations for the 
Schengen border). See Copenhagen (2002). 
12 This Berlin conclusion can be found in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, Article 7.8.   8
 
Programming and Institution-building 
 
In the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds the President of the European Commission Jacques Delors 
had to make propositions aimed at the more effective use of Structural Funds in order to bring them to 
work together and not separately, as had occurred before then13. The principles of programming, 
concentration,  partnership, and additionality were introduced accompanied by two operational 
principles, namely, the principles of co-financing, and of monitoring and evaluation. The Structural 
Funds principles provide a framework according to which the use of Structural Funds must be 
programmed and organised in a strategic way and concentrated around the prescribed objectives, the 
partners of the EU, national, and regional levels have to be consulted, and national co-financing must 
bring on board additional funds for Structural Policy meaning that a national budget’s funds are not to 
be merely substituted by EU funds. The objectives and aims of using the funds must be presented, 
including the results to be achieved for the next period.  
Of all Structural Funds’ principles, the programming principle is the most important one for the 
purposes of our paper. Namely, through this principle the main parts of institution-building exercises 
were performed in the Candidate Countries in the pre-accession period.  
 
Building the administrative capacity in pre-accession period 
 
When the European Commission started to require the preparation of national planning and 
programming documents in order to place the pre-accession funds in a coherent way and in line with 
the EU’s regulations and practice at the end of the 1990s, this meant an uneasy process in the CEECs. 
Implementing individual projects without a programme base was the reality of many cases in CEECs 
and investment projects were approved on a project-by-project base without a comprehensive strategic 
national development document14. Only with the introduction of additional pre-accession instruments, 
namely, SAPARD15 as a pre-fund of the EU’s rural development programmes, and ISPA16 as a pre-
fund of the Cohesion Fund, in 1998 the Commission expressed the need for intensive programming 
activities while preparing those documents. In the framework of the Phare programme for economic 
and social cohesion a ‘Special Preparatory Programme for Structural Funds’ (hereafter: SPP) in the 
Accession Countries was introduced with the main objective to help Candidate Countries in building 
up the institutions for managing Structural Funds at the central government level, and executing 
Objective 1 type pilot projects in the pilot regions of respective countries. Through this programme the 
Commission pointed out the institution-building exercises at the central government level as one of the 
main priority tasks of accession.  
 
The SPP was aimed at preparing Candidate Countries to design and implement the Objective 1 type of 
programmes, supporting national structure-building and preparing the country to manage the pre-
                                                 
13 The reforms that introduced the Structural Policy as we know it today started at the end of the 1980s for the 
programme period 1989-1993, while reforms are underway in preparations of the next programme period 
between 2007-2013. For an overview see Tondl (1995) and (2001),  Mitchie/Fitzgerald (1997). 
14 Such an absence of the development strategies accompanied by solid financial means and clear strategic 
objectives and measures that would meet EU standards can be explained by the fact that at the start of the 1990s 
these countries were coming from socialistic planning systems. Therefore, their first worries were to transform 
and adapt their countries’ macroeconomics to the market system, similar to those in Western Europe. The same 
can be argued for the development strategies of those countries: the main purpose was to stabilise the country 
politically and economically; the development policies came on to the agenda only when accession became 
visible enough. 
15 SAPARD stands for ‘Special Action Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development’. 
16 ISPA stands for ‘Instrument for Structural Policy for Pre-accession’.   9
accession instruments PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD17. For instance, in Slovenia, SPP as a tool to link 
the pre-accession period and accession started in July 1999 and was seen as an intergovernmental 
approach of co-operation and preparation for the implementation of Structural Funds (see Slovenia 
SPP-Twinning, 2001; Slovenia SPP-TA, 2002). The results of the SPP exercises have so far been 
mixed. The somehow reluctant attitude of the Slovenian administration is also reflected in certain 
other Candidate Countries. This might bring us to the conclusion that the SPP implementation was too 
early. Consequently, all exercises were not taken as seriously by the central administrations as desired 
by the Commission. The results in this paper show that this fact might have some negative 
consequences also for the administrative absorption capacity. 
 
The process of institution-building by preparing programme documents for Structural Policy in the 
Candidate Countries since 1998 can be seen as evolutionary, involving three phases. The first phase, 
started with Phare and the preparing of Preliminary National Development Plans before 2000, the 
second phase was an intermediate phase of co-ordinating all pre-accession funds with national 
development priorities (NDP) while the third phase is when programming is concentrated on the 
strategic documents that will be used when the accession is completed.  
 
Figure 1 reveals the evolution of programming documents from before 2000 through to the time of 
full membership. In all three phases of preparation we can recognise a common thread of linking 
strategic development planning with both current (PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD) and potential future EU 
funds. In the last column of Figure 1 we see that the Cohesion Fund18 has to be dealt with in a separate 
strategic document, however, a coherent approach between CSF/SPD priorities and CF projects has to 
be assured. The same also applies to the Rural Development Plan19 of the Guarantee section of the 
EAGGF.  
 
For the programming of the Phare programme of social and economic cohesion in the 2000-2002 
period, the Candidate Countries had to prepare their Preliminary National Development Plans and 
started on preparations for the National Development Plans for the period till 2006. In the period 
2000-2002 respective National Development Plans were presented to the Commission and, by the end 
of 2003, the Community Support Frameworks and Single Programming Documents were agreed with 
the Commission. After official accession in May 2004 formal process as required by the General 
Regulation also started. 
 
                                                 
17 The results of the first SPP are still a ‘work in progress’. However, in Slovenia neither close co-operation nor 
the co-ordination of all pre-accession instruments has been established through the SPP. An additional issue 
involved the Technical Assistance team. Namely, co-operation between the typical Technical Assistance 
component in the form of a consulting company and the Twinning component in the form of government 
officials from a Member State was not always complementary. Due to the special nature of the Twinning 
exercise in general, this co-operation was not easily dealt with. In some Candidate Countries, a second phase 
called SPP II started in 2002 and 2003. The Twinning Covenant between Germany and Slovenia was signed in 
the summer of 2003 (see Slovenia SPP II, 2003).  
18 For Cohesion Funds see the following regulations: Council Regulation (EC) No. 1264/1999 and 
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1386/2002. 
19 For the Rural Development Plan, see Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1750/1999, for the EGGF see 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999.   10
 
Figure 1:  Three phases of Programming in Candidate Countries 
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Source: own drawing based on Slovenia’s SPP-TA (2002). 
 
 
In the period 1998-2000 the Candidate Countries had to make a number of internal institutional 
decisions regarding implementation of the EU’s Structural Policy. For instance, in Slovenia in 1999 
(see SI-Act, 1999) and Lithuania in 2000 (see Nakrosis, 2003) new laws on regional development 
were introduced, adapting the national regional policy to the EU principles. In the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary regionalisation in accordance with the NUTS divisions has been executed and 
new NUTS 2 statistical regions have been constructed and taken on the title of ‘cohesion regions’20.  
 
Since 2000 the Candidate Countries have been eligible to receive assistance under the Phare Economic 
and Social Cohesion component (for Productive Environment and Human Resource Development), 
ISPA (for environment and transport infrastructure), and SAPARD (for rural development). For Phare 
programming purposes, the Candidate Countries had to prepare Preliminary Development Plans for 
the three-year period 2000-2002 and some time later a National Development Plan. Both documents 
received financial support from Phare’s Special Preparatory Programme in the framework of the 
institution-building process. The original idea of the PNDP was to prepare a programming document 
for pre-accession instruments, while that of the NDP was to concentrate all development activities of a 
country under one umbrella document in order to use the same logic (concentration) when preparing 
the CSF/SPD documents for Structural Actions and to achieve synergies with other EU and national 
development funds. However, the existing loose inter-ministerial or intergovernmental co-ordination 
in this field in Candidate Countries can hardly be replaced by an ‘EU logic’ of preparing development 
documents and resulting in a coherent development strategy.  
                                                 
20 For regional planning and regional policy in some Central and Eastern European Countries, see e.g. Sykora 
(1999), Kosarczyn (2001), Petkevicius (2001), VATI (2002).    11
Therefore, both PNDPs and NDPs were mostly a collection of sectoral development strategies with 
too many sometimes even competing objectives and priorities, with no direct link to the development 
parts of the respective national budgets. Without sufficiently elaborated financial components, we 
could describe these documents as mere ‘tigers without teeth’.21  
 
We can see that the preparations to enhance administrative capacities for dealing with the EU’s 
Structural Funds in the Candidate Countries were a very important aim of both the European 
Commission and Candidate Countries. Preparations of strategic documents such as PNDPs and NDPs 
became a tool in overall institution-building in the Candidate Countries. These valuable experiences 
were also used later in the process of preparing Community Support Frameworks and Single 
Programming Documents. We will see later in this paper that these preparations form an important 
part of the indicators for measuring administrative absorption capacity in the Candidate Countries. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE ABSORPTION CAPACITIES IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
AND REGIONS 
 
The question of administrative capacity regarding the use of Structural Funds in new Member States 
emerged when these countries revealed differences in their use of Pre-accession instruments, 
especially the Phare funds22. However, the performance and functioning of the Structural Funds can 
hardly be measured in CEECs because of the absence of experience in Structural Fund management 
there and the different managing systems employed when dealing with Pre-accession instruments, on 
the one hand, and Structural Funds, on the other23. 
 
In this part of our paper we, first, present the methodology the European Commission developed in 
January/February 2002 that later proved to be appropriate enough for calculating the absorption 
capacities of Candidate Countries. However, these calculations were not made during the negotiations 
nor were they explicitly used by the European Commission. We can speculate that the Commission 
already had a relatively clear picture of the low absorption capacities of Candidate Countries before 
the negotiations. It is very likely the Commission did not want to present such calculations because 
this might not have been politically good for the enlargement.24  
                                                 
21 This was definitely the case in Slovenia and Hungary. In Slovenia the PNDP did not establish a direct link 
with the national budget, but the NDP also did not succeed completely (see PNDP Slovenia,  1999;  NDP 
Slovenia,  2001). In Hungary, for instance, three versions of the PNDP were prepared and sent to the 
Commission in late 1999, April 2000 and December 2000. In addition, another plan, the Szechenyi Plan, 
prepared by the Ministry of the Economy was approved in 2001 by the Hungarian government. It was limited to 
the Ministry of the Economy portfolios and was mostly an investment plan financially guaranteed up to 2001 and 
2002, only. It also excluded areas such as human resources and the environment. See Pires (2001). 
22 See Martens (2001), European Commission (2003b, Annex). 
23 Phare is permanently changing and is now in the phasing-out process in new Member States (see European 
Commission, 2002b). 
24 We should explain this brave statement by using the public choice considerations and the related information 
disadvantage of both. Firstly, voters going to EU enlargement referenda in the respective Candidate Countries 
and, secondly, by Members of Parliaments in the respective EU Member States that have to agree with the 
Accession Treaty (2003) signed in Athens in April 2003. The Commission was never very keen on discussing 
the issue of limited administrative absorption capacities in the Candidate Countries and by that a potential EU 
investment into sub-optimal projects. Therefore, we can claim that the Commission was not interested in 
increasing transparency in this field by investing more funds for research and publicity here. Anyway, the 
Commission was to a great extent dealing with the governments of respective Candidate Countries. Neither the 
voters in the Candidate Countries nor in the Member States will know that the chosen policy is sub-optimal. For 
more on public choice considerations see also Smyth et al. (1994), Vaubel (1995).   12
 
We present some institution-building activities introduced by the European Commission with the 
purpose to prepare Candidate Countries for the EU’s Structural Policy. Here, by institution-building 
we mean either the adjustment, upgrading or foundation of administrative structures, systems and 
tools, human resources, and programming documents. We may claim that, during introduction of the 
Structural Funds in the Candidate Countries, the process of preparing programming documents was 
the central point of the overall institution-building exercise. 
 
Second, at the start of 2002 assessments of the administrative capacity for Structural Funds in 
Candidate Countries were presented to the Commission. By comparing experiences of EU Cohesion 
Countries such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Germany’s Eastern Länder these assessments 
developed key indicators for measuring Candidate Countries’ administrative capacities. The results of 
these assessments reveal a very normative and mainstream view of managing Structural Funds; as 
required by the General Regulations for Structural Funds. This means that were the EU Member 
States’ administrative absorptions capacities to be checked by the same standards (key indicators) as 
developed for the Candidate Countries, some Member States may well have serious problems.25 
 
Third, we will present our calculations on administrative capacities in five Candidate Countries, 
namely, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia. These calculations are based on 
the methodology developed by NEI (2002a) and tested by Papadopoulos (2003). However, new data 
from the respective countries were used, the calculations were updated, and any strategic documents 
available also helped upgrade the calculations. With this method we can make some preliminary 
statements regarding the present administrative capacity in a particular new Member State. This 
should provide additional information for the overall absorption capacity of the countries in the 2004-
2006 programme period. 
 
Administrative Absorption Concept for the Candidate Countries26 
 
Here, we would like to present the concept of how to measure administrative absorption capacities in 
Candidate Countries.  
 
When looking at three variables (see NEI, 2002c) like the performance, functioning and design of 
Structural Funds we very quickly discover there are limitations in each of them when measuring 
absorption capacity in Candidate Countries. Performance, the extent to which the Structural Funds 
have been managed effectively and efficiently, can be determined at the end of a programming period 
(ex-post). But since the new Member States are at the beginning of their first programming period, 
performance cannot be measured for the Structural Funds in these countries. Further, the functioning 
of Structural Funds cannot be measured in new Member States because no effective or efficient 
management of the Funds is in place in these countries.27  
Therefore, most attention should be given to design. Design variables can be considered to create the 
conditions for the effective and efficient management of Structural Funds and need to be related to the 
requirements of the Structural Funds’ General Regulations. Both changes in design and requirements 
                                                 
25 For instance, here we should mention the case of Monitoring and Evaluation, and in particular the 
development or functioning of an information system for Structural Funds. For the case of the European 
Regional Development Fund and its Management and Control Systems for 2000-2006 Structural Fund 
Programmes, see European Commission (2003a). 
26 Sources on administrative absorption capacity are mainly Papadopoulos (2003, 2003a), Pires (2001) and the 
NEI (2002, 2002a-c). 
27 However, some deductions can be made for both performance and functioning, namely, from the experience of 
the functioning of the pre-accession funds currently in place. For calculations on pre-accession funds see Horvat 
(2004).   13
will have an impact on functioning and ultimately on performance. However, we must be aware that 
the concept of absorption rates and absorption capacity is merely input-oriented and therefore 
insufficient to gauge the economic impact of transfers.  
 
The abovementioned can be summarised in the following concept: 
 
DESIGN (S+HR+S&T) 
-------------------------- = FunctioningÆ Administrative CapacityÆ AbsorptionÆ 
Performance 
REQUIREMENTS         Macro    Efficiency 
             Co-finance    Effectiveness 
 
 
The concept demonstrates the importance of proper design (Structure, Human Resources, Systems 
and Tools) as an input for managing Structural Funds, in relation to the requirements. The ratio 
between design and requirements determines the actual functioning of a system (throughput), or the 
supply side of administrative capacity, whereas the actual ability of project applicants to generate 
projects is seen as the demand side of administrative capacity. The study of the Netherlands Economic 
Institute (NEI, 2002a-c) focused predominantly on the supply side of administrative capacity. Other 
factors that determine absorption are the Macro- and the Co-financing situations. Ultimately, 
absorption capacity only leads to the strong performance of Structural Funds if efficiency and 
effectiveness are fully taken into account. 
 
The structure, human resources, systems and tools together provide complementary elements of the 
Management Capability Grid (see NEI, 2002a).  Structure relates to the clear assignment of 
responsibilities and tasks to national institutions that deal with Structural Funds in fields such as: (1) 
management; (2) programming; (3) implementation; (4) evaluation and monitoring; and (5) financial 
management and control. Human Resources relate to the ability to detail tasks and responsibilities at 
the levels of: (1) preparing job descriptions; (2) the number and qualifications of staff; and (3) 
fulfilling recruitment needs. A key success factor in the management of Structural Funds is 
experienced and motivated people. Clearly, the conditions within the administrative system need to be 
favourable for recruiting and retaining such professionals. Systems and Tools relate to the availability 
of instruments, methods, guidelines, manuals, procedures, forms etc., which enable the organisations 
managing Structural Funds to transform implicit knowledge stored in the heads of individuals into 
explicit knowledge that can be shared across organisations. This is especially important in times when 
key staff may leave an organisation and hence with such tools the risk of malfunctioning will be 
reduced. 
 
Combining the dimensions of the management capability grid and the policy life cycle results in the 
so-called Structural Funds Management Grid. The Structural Funds Management Grid provides an 
overall framework and a checklist of topics that play a role in implementing sound management of 
Structural Funds throughout the policy life cycle. It emphasises the design aspects, but also takes the 
functioning aspects into account.  
 
The idea of the management grid developed was to identify key indicators of measuring absorption 
capacities in Candidate Countries even before their membership. The main purpose of this exercise 
was to assess any needs and shortcomings in the current state of their preparations for the EU’s 
Structural Policies. Each cell of the Structural Funds Management Grid was covered, resulting in 20 
key indicators (see Table 1). The key indicators were developed for Candidate Countries to effectively 
manage the Structural Funds. However, these key indicators can also be used when calculating the 
administrative absorption capacity of Member States in the future. 
   14
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Testing key indicators in 10 Candidate Countries 
 
During the summer-winter months of 2002 the key indicators were tested in 10 countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. In April 2003 the Commission presented the results of this Administrative 
Capacity Study at the annual meeting of ISPA partners (see Boijmans, 2003, and Breska, 2003). 
Below we present the methodology of the study of Papadopoulos (2003). 
 
The questions and recommendations accompanying the key indicators relate to (see NEI, 2002a, 
Boijmans, 2003, and Breska, 2003), firstly, the institutions necessary for managing Structural Funds 
(Structure), secondly, staffing and availability of appropriate expertise in these institutions (Human 
Resources) and, thirdly, to the working materials such as guidelines and manuals or, for instance, the 
existence of a computerised evaluation system necessary for reporting to both the European 
Commission and the national government (Systems and Tools). The additional question for each key 
indicator is also related with practical information such as the existence of a modern civil service or 
absorption of pre-accession funds (Functioning). The answers to these questions are then compared to 
the requirements expressed by the General Regulations for Structural Funds.  
 
For the Candidate Countries the main questions relating to the Structure of all five key indicators are, 
for example, whether Managing and Paying Authorities in a particular country have already been 
designated and functioning. Looking at the experience of EU Cohesion Countries there is usually only 
one overall (or CSF) Managing Authority with several sectoral and regional MAs. Development of 
Structural Fund managing systems in these countries since 1989 has shown that this may be the most 
efficient system. In the case of the SPD no sectoral or regional operational programmes are to be   15
prepared separately, but the SPD consists of one programme with more priorities and measures. Here, 
the experience of some successful Objective 1 regions such as that for Wales (see Wales SPD, 1999) 
should be taken into account. Also the designation of Intermediate Bodies and monitoring and 
evaluation responsibilities should be institutionally concentrated as much as possible in the case of 
Candidate Countries.  
 
Between February and May 2003 the ten Candidate Countries (including Cyprus and Malta and 
excluding Bulgaria and Romania) altogether submitted to the European Commission 37 programmes 
(see  Boijmans, 2003). Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Malta submitted one Single 
Programming Document each. All other countries28 negotiated with the Commission about the 
Community Support Frameworks and plenty of operational programmes29. According to the 
recommendations of the Commission and the best practices in Member States, the ‘golden rule’ is as 
follows; the smaller the number of institutions (usually sectoral Ministries) involved at the levels of 
Management and Programmes (Sectoral and Regional) presented at the level of Programming in the 
Candidate Countries, the clearer the picture and higher the possibility of better administrative 
absorption of Structural Funds.  
 
Regarding the Structures, we should also note the presence of Partnership, meaning that programming 
should not be executed solely by the central administration but also with the active involvement of 
social partners, non-government organisations and representatives of local interests. The involvement 
of partners should not only be provided through the possibility to visit an Internet site with all relevant 
data regarding preparation of the NDP, but also by involving partners early on in the process of 
preparing Work Plans of NDP preparations, for instance. Where civil society is only invited to 
participate just before the deadlines for submission of programming documents to the Commission, 
this may result in their serious protests and comments, thereby causing delays in the whole 
programming process. 
 
The relevant institutions at all levels must have well-trained Human Resources able to deal with the 
tasks of Structural Fund management. The staff must also be equipped with appropriate job 
descriptions, while their remuneration levels should be competitive enough compared to remuneration 
levels in the private sector. The number of sufficient candidates for vacancies is another important 
indicator showing whether prestige is attached to work in the public sector. Important indicators in this 
regard include the utilisation of personnel experienced in the pre-accession instruments and procedures 
as well as the existence of a modern civil service, where the attractiveness of public sector work might 
also be seen in existing career paths of civil servants and job mobility between ministries and 
government departments. For the sustainability of Structural Fund management in the public sector, 
the most important are Systems and Tools such as: written procedures, guidelines, manuals and similar 
documents. These materials should guarantee the accumulation and transfer of know-how. 
 
The current Functioning of the administration is also very important. Management attention must go 
to all areas of the policy life cycle, notably financial management and control and implementation, but 
also programming and monitoring and evaluation. For a head-start in 2004 existing experience gained 
in the pre-accession stage must be utilised, wherever applicable and useful. It is crucial that 
organisations develop a capacity to learn from their previous experience. The most important indicator 
of the future performance of Structural Funds management may include the absorption capacity of pre-
accession funds and the related project pipeline for them. Here absorption rates can be calculated and 
                                                 
28 Exceptions are Cyprus that submitted 3 Single Programming Documents, one for each Objective, and the 
Czech Republic that provided one Objective 2 SPD for Prague and one Objective 3 SPD. Two SPDs were also 
submitted by the Slovak Republic, one Objective 2 for Bratislava and one Objective 3, respectively.  
29 Poland submitted one CSF with 7 operational programmes (6 sectoral, 1 regional). The Czech Republic 
provided one CSF with four sectoral and one regional operational programme. The Slovaks are also going to 
negotiate one Objective 1 CSF accompanied by four operational programmes. Hungary presented the 
Commission with one CSF with four sectoral and one regional operational programme. For more, see Horvat 
(2004: Case Study 4).   16
project pipelines demonstrated for Phare, ISPA and SAPARD programmes, respectively. But 
indicators such as the existence and quality of a National Development Plan and the process of its 
preparation can also provide information on the functioning of the administration in a particular 
country. 
 
Country Analysis in Five Candidate Countries: Ready-Steady-Go? 
 
In mid-July 2003 the European Commission in its Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council exposed the state of play in Candidate Countries’ administrative capacities in the fields of 
regional policy and co-ordination of Structural Instruments (Chapter 21) with the main message: 
‘Acceding countries need to further strengthen their administrative capacity’30. The information 
provided by the proposed  new Member States followed detailed Questionnaires sent out by the 
Commission in the spring of 2003. This activity should encourage the accession countries to prepare 
their respective administrations for the EU’s Structural Policy by the end of 2003, because the 
Commission will be not able to approve EU funding until all conditions set out in the General 
Regulations for Structural Actions are satisfied. 
 
Among others (see European Commission, 2003c, p. 3ff), the main conclusions of this Report were 
summarised as follows: 
-  institutional arrangements of the implementation system are still not finalised and an issue of 
particular concern for the Commission is the role of Intermediate Bodies and the missing 
written agreements between different managing and implementing bodies; 
-  the recruitment of additional staff has been delayed, in those countries where relevant bodies 
have been designated they seem to be understaffed in view of their future tasks, particular 
attention needs to be paid to the administrative capacity of regional and local administrations, 
the public administrations have problems in attracting and retaining qualified and motivated 
staff; and 
-  generally, much remains to be done. 
 
In the following section we evaluate administrative absorption capacity in Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia, respectively. We had wanted to use the method developed 
for the Candidate Countries by the NEI (2002a-c) and later tested on a sample of ten Candidate 
Countries by Papadopoulos (2003). However, we realised that the documents available in the time 
before the negotiations were concluded are insufficient for making an analysis of a similar size. Since 
in the second half of 2003 the accession was, in terms of administrative capacity and negotiating the 
relevant programme documents, still a ‘work in progress’ neither government or Commission officials 
were willing to provide the additional information we requested by e-mail31. 
 
However, we used some key indicators such as management, programming and implementation in 
selected five proposed new Member States in order to present the administrative capacity of these 
countries to absorb the Structural Funds. After examining some of the main relevant strategic 
development documents such as NDPs, CSFs/SPDs, and some materials flowing between the 
Commission and the new Member States with regard to Chapter 21 – Structural and Regional Policy, 
we could identify that the situation described in the documents had definitely improved compared to 
the findings of Papadopoulos (2003).  
                                                 
30 See Press Releases Rapid (2003a); http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/newsroom/index_en.htm. 
31 We tried to obtain additional information regarding financial parts of the programming documents as well as 
the administrative capacity from the DG REGIO and the Candidate Countries in the sample. However, it was 
impossible to have discussions regarding the financial parts. For the administrative capacity part there is no 
central institution in a particular Candidate Country that prepares any kind of ‘follow-up’ to the Questionnaire. 
The next similar report by the Commission is foreseen to be presented in November 2003 (see European 
Commission, 2003c).   17
 
Therefore, we decided to look at the figures regarding planned and existing personnel in the 
institutions designated in the new Member States for managing and implementing the EU’s Structural 
Policy in the programme period 2004-2006. Then we calculated the key indicators for administrative 
capacity in selected Candidate Countries and compared the results with those of Papadopoulos 
(2003). 
Through this method we shall make some preliminary statements on the administrative capacity in 
particular new Member States, as of the second half of 2003. This should provide additional 
information about the overall absorption capacity of the countries in the 2004-2006 programme period. 
 
Short review of institutional arrangements regarding personnel 
 
We saw before that real institutional preparations for Structural Funds management started in 1998-99 
with the introduction of Phare Special Preparatory Programmes for Structural Funds (SPP) in 
Candidate Countries. Technical assistance was combined with commercial consulting companies and 
Twinning arrangements with EU Member States. At the beginning of that period, institutions were 
selected by Candidate Countries to prepare preliminary programming documents in order to later take 
on the roles of Managing Authorities, Paying Authorities and Intermediate Bodies. The ministries or 
ministerial organs that performed the role of co-ordinating bodies for Structural Funds from 1998 
onwards received permanently support in the form of training, seminars, study trips and on-the-job 
training and foreign technical assistance from the Member States.  
Annex 1 reveals the planned and present personnel of the most important institutions responsible for 
managing and implementing Structural Funds in five Candidate Countries. The best overall 
performance regarding available personnel is by Hungary and Estonia and the worst by Slovakia. 
When observing the number of personnel in Managing Authorities and Paying Authorities (MA+PA) 
and comparing this number with the total shares in Intermediate Bodies, in general we can report 
higher values for the case of MA+PA; only in the Czech Republic is the situation the opposite, with 
currently better equipped Intermediate Bodies. 
 
However, we must note that the comparison between the present and planned number of personnel 
could vary from country to country for different reasons and, consequently, be unrealistic. For 
instance, some countries’ ministries presented unrealistically high, ambit numbers of planned 
personnel in order to win approval for at least some of the staff from their respective governments. But 
the opposite could also apply, where some countries presented lower initial numbers in the 
negotiations on Chapter 21 in order to move more quickly towards the desired numbers of Chapter 21 
and to thereby please the Commission and gain a better country score in the next Regular Report. 
We are well aware of the risks this indicator carries. Therefore, we decided to also calculate the funds 
by administrative staff. We believe this indicator presented a much more realistic situation. 
 
Discussion 1: Political change and consequences for absorption 
 
Every political change of a government might also change the role of institutions dealing with 
preparations for Structural Actions of the EU. Since every central administration needs a certain period 
of time to adapt to the new political situation and to new or different tasks, we could say that political 
change runs parallel with some negative consequences for the accession process of a country. This 
goes together with the judgement that, for administrative preparedness of Structural Funds, the bodies 
that were from the very beginning dealing with co-ordination and preparations for Structural Policy 
should remain the same government institutions. However, on the other side, by establishing new 
governmental bodies and/or merging tasks and functions related to Structural Funds new synergies 
could also be achieved and the administration’s efficiency increased. In the latter case, political change 
could result in positive institutional change.   18
There is, however, a very important question of what happens with the personnel involved in the 
accession process so far: would they be merged with other bodies within the new institution or remain 
with the old body? We believe that, despite the fact that every political change might slow an 
administration’s accession preparations, the worst can be avoided – of even the best achieved – when 
continuity in personnel is ensured.  
Thus, continuity in personnel is a very important factor when we discuss the absorption capacity in 
Candidate Countries. It enables the administration to build up a knowledge curve and helps new staff 
reach a certain level of knowledge as soon as possible.  
 
However, the results in Annex 1 reveal a different situation after the change of government. In the 
cases of Hungary (see Q-HU, 2003), Estonia (Q-EE, 2003) and Slovenia (Q-SI, 2003), respectively, 
we reported general elections but at the same time these three countries presented different shares of 
presently employed staff set to deal with the Structural Funds from 2004 onwards. On the other side, 
in the Czech Republic there was continuity in institutional co-ordinating preparations for Structural 
Funds, but the shares of personnel were among the lowest of all Candidate Countries (see e.g. Q-CZ, 
2003; CZ NDP, 2003). 
In the case of Hungary , we can claim that the change of government and consequent concentration of 
the main managerial and programming tasks in the Prime Minister’s Office in the spring of 2002 
happened almost two years before the time of accession (see e.g. HU NDP, 2003; Master Plan, 
2002). Therefore, the merger of different departments from different ministries in the one Office was 
effected smoothly enough in order for the administration to adapt to new circumstances and not to 
overly influence the institution-building process. In Estonia, general elections in spring 2003 did not 
see the moving, say, of the Managing Authority to some other department or ministry of the 
government; both the Managing Authority and Paying Authority remained with the same ministry, the 
Ministry of Finance. For Slovenia, the relative poor results regarding personnel employed can be 
explained by the change of government and establishment of a new Managing Authority in December 
2002. While the Managing Authority was previously meant to be the Ministry of the Economy, the 
newly established Managing Authority has the status of a government office under a Minister without 
Portfolio. 
 
We now list some recommendations regarding political influence on institutional constructions for 
Structural Fund management. 
1. Wherever there is a political decision to concentrate tasks of the future Managing Authority in 
another institution of government, this must be accompanied by the following: 
-  it has to be executed as soon as possible before the end of the accession process in order to 
allow the new Managing Authority to prepare for new tasks and for other institutions to accept 
the new situation; and  
-  the new government body representing the Managing Authority must have strong political 
support and be as close as possible to the Prime Minister. We believe that, in the case of 
Slovenia, it would have been better to concentrate the Managing Authority tasks in an existing 
government body such as the Ministry of Finance or the Prime Minister’s Office than to create 
a completely new institution.  
2. Continuity in institutions is no guarantee of good performance in personnel, as we can see in the 
cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, Slovakia’s relatively poor performance may 
involve its late start in the accession negotiations.    19
 
Discussion 2: Funding levels to be administered per administrator? 
 
Since no benchmark has been developed for the number of staff needed to deal with Structural Funds 
in Member States32, it is hard to make any statements regarding absolute numbers of planned 
personnel in each Candidate Country. However, we believe it is worthwhile attempting to identify 
human resources relative to the funding to be administered. 
 
When looking for reasons for the low share of employees compared to the planned staff levels in the 
Czech Republic (see Q-CZ,  2003) and Slovakia ( Q-SK,  2003)  we note: first, for government 
institutions in all Candidate Countries EU accession provided a good opportunity to increase their 
human resources levels. In particular, this has been the case of governmental bodies due to deal with 
Structural and Cohesion Funds management and implementation. The case of the Czech Republic 
shows that its planning of human resources seems unrealistic simply for budget reasons. This was also 
the conclusion of the European Commission (2003c).  
The second explanation is the relatively late official decision regarding the allocation of commitment 
appropriations to new Member States. Namely, before the Candidate Countries’ governments had 
been informed of the exact financial figures they were quite generous when planning staff levels but 
quite restrictive in employing the staff agreed in the framework of the accession negotiations. The time 
lag here is obvious; the plans were agreed with the Commission in the summer of 2002 (see e.g. SI 
Chapter 21, 2002), but the exact figures for commitment appropriations were only agreed in December 
2002 in Copenhagen. 
 
Table 2  allows a comparison  of the amounts of commitment appropriations with the planned 
personnel levels by each Candidate Country in order to see the average amount of funds to be 
administered by a single person. This should yield information regarding how realistic a country’s 
administration’s planning of personnel is.  
First, we compared total Structural Actions (Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund together) with the 
total number of planned staff by countries. In this case, in Slovenia one administrator should manage 
MEUR 4 on average and in Estonia only MEUR 1.2.  
Second, we only compared commitment appropriations for Structural Funds with the total number of 
planned staff. In this case, the Cohesion Fund’s allocations were excluded but the number of staff 
remained the same as in the first case. We see in Table 2 in the case of Structural Funds only Slovenia 
(MEUR 2.3) is bettered by Slovakia (MEUR 2.5) as a country with the highest amount of funding to 
be managed by a single administrator; the reason simply being the higher share of Cohesion Fund 
allocations in the overall Structural Actions in Slovenia.  
                                                 
32 This was also one of the conclusions of the Country Reports by the NEI (2002b), dealing with key indicators 
of administrative absorption capacity in the EU Cohesion Countries.   20
 
Table 2:  Financial allocations and related administrative personnel 
 



















HU  2,847 1,853 1,967  1.45 0.9 
CZ  2,328 1,490  672  3.5 2.2 
SK  1,560 1,051  424  3.7 2.5 
EE  618  342  532  1.2 0.6 
SLO  405  237  102  4.0 2.3 
 
Sources: Financial data are from respective draft CSF/SPDs for Hungary (HU NDP, 2003), the Czech 
Republic (CZ NDP,  2003), Slovakia (SK Negotiation Mandate,  2003), Estonia (EE NDP-SPD, 
2003) and Slovenia (Slovenia SPD, 2003). Data on staff are from Annex 1: Planned and present 
personnel for implementing Structural Actions. 
 
 
As stated above, we cannot speak of more or less appropriate numbers of staff to manage funds on 
average. However, we can conclude from the results of Table 2 what each country thinks regarding its 
personnel plans. There certainly are big differences among the Candidate Countries. Relevant 
questions here include:  
-  is it possible for a Slovenian, Slovak or Czech administrator to successfully absorb on average 
MEUR 4 and MEUR 3.5 or have these countries overestimated their administrative capacity 
and now need additional personnel?; and 
-  have Estonia and Hungary perhaps anticipated too many personnel to deal with the EU 
allocations? 
 
In addition, the results of Table 2 answer the statement made at the start of this discussion, namely, 
for budget reasons the plans for additional personnel in the Czech Republic and Slovakia may be 
unrealistic but, compared with other Candidate Countries in this sample, they may even be 
underestimated. 
 
Administrative absorption capacity: To Go?! 
 
In the previous sub-chapter we briefly analysed the situation of numbers of present and planned 
personnel in crucial institutions such as Managing Authorities, Paying Authorities and Intermediate 
Bodies. We saw that since there is no benchmark for the necessary personnel for managing and 
implementing Structural Funds it is very hard to make any clear statements about how well or poorly 
prepared a particular Candidate Country is. 
 
In this section we went a step further in our analysis of administrative absorption capacity in Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia. We used the same method as developed by NEI 
(2002a) and tested by Papadopoulos (2003, 2003a). However, we relied on information from recent 
programming documents and new supporting materials such as Candidate Countries’ responses to 
Questionnaires. Of the five key indicators developed by the NEI  (2002a), namely, Management, 
Programming, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Financial Management and Control 
we did a desk analysis of the first three indicators only. The quality of the new documents and the type   21
of our analysis (desk only, no interviews) did not allow us to deal with all five key indicators. The 
same was the case when dealing with some benchmark questions such as the Functioning of the civil 
service in a particular country where we simply had to take points from the test of Papadopoulos. 
Therefore, we adapted the NEI’s method to our situation whereby we used the new materials from 
Candidate Countries and executed our own calculations regarding personnel.  
 
The basic calculations of the results in Table 3 as well as additional explanatory notes are presented in 
Annex 2. Annex 2 shows the scores for each country by key indicator and sub-indicators. We can see 
the total score by main indicators for five Candidate Countries. The highest score is registered for 
Hungary and Estonia, 51 points each, the Czech Republic (44 points) and Slovenia (42 points) are in 
the middle, while the lowest score is in Slovakia (34 points). In brackets we put the difference between 
our score and the score given by Papadopoulos (2003). The best improvement can be registered for 
Hungary (+10) and the worst for Slovakia (-6). 
 













































































(1) We calculated percentages by adding the countries’ scores by each main indicator and comparing 
them with the maximum points possible. Thus, we received the percentage for Management by adding 
scores for this indicator of all five countries (92 points) and comparing this figure with the maximum 
possible score (120), yielding a result of 66%. 
(2) In brackets is the difference in score between our evaluations and the evaluation of Papadopoulos 
(2003).  
 
Source: own evaluations 
 
 
We also calculated the relative success of each key indicator when taking all the countries together. 
Table 3 reveals that the five Candidate Countries are most advanced in Management (77%), and are 
doing worst in Implementation. The former can be explained by the fact that all Managing Authorities 
have been already designated and are relatively well-staffed, the reason for the latter is the opposite: 
all Intermediate Bodies have not been designated yet and there is still a lot of unclarity within the 
future IBs in some Candidate Countries.  
When we compare our calculations in Table 3 with the calculations of Papadopoulos (2003), we can 
see that the situation improved since the Autumn 2002 when field work for that study was carried out 
in the Candidate Countries. The highest improvement can be observed in the case of Programming 
(from 45% in Papadopoulos to 73% in our paper) showing that by the end of April all Candidate 
Countries had submitted their main programming documents to the Commission. Based on these   22
documents, we were also able to evaluate them from the viewpoint of vertical sub-indicators, such as 
Partnership, Capacity to carry out programming and Guidelines for programme preparations. 
 
In  Table 4  we see the horizontal and vertical assessment of administrative capacity of the five 
countries. The ranking by horizontal and vertical assessment goes from A (Overall Strong Capacity) 
to D (Insufficient Capacity). We used this ranking in our calculations, which can be found in Annex 3. 
 
Above we described the horizontal score by key indicators in the Candidate Countries. Table 4 shows 
that in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia administrative capacity in Management was 
evaluated as sufficient overall, while in Slovakia and Slovenia the capacity was judged as not yet 
sufficient. In the case of Programming the Slovak administration was evaluated as being insufficiently 
prepared mainly because all main programming documents were prepared by consultants and not by 
the Slovak administration. In all five countries the indicator Implementation was evaluated with a C 
and, therefore, this reveals insufficient capacity in all five Candidate Countries.  
 
Each key indicator has been evaluated from the aspect of sub-indicators, such as: Structures, Human 
Resources, Systems and Tools, and Functioning (see Table 1). We see in Table 4 that, according to 
sub-indicator Structures, only administration in Estonia was evaluated as having an overall strong 
capacity and being ready for the Structural Funds. Other countries still have to address certain 
weaknesses, especially in the consultation process and the involvement of social partners, NGOs and 
broad civil society in the programming process for Structural Funds. 
The worst prepared area in all five Candidate Countries was Human Resources and Systems and 
Tools. Here, administration capacity of no country was evaluated as sufficient yet, with the Slovakian 
administration having no basis for administering Funds from the viewpoint of these two sub-
indicators. Looking at the sub-indicator Functioning only, the situation in Hungary was judged as 
ready for Structural Funds, in Estonia certain weaknesses were still observed, while in the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia the capacity is insufficient. For Slovakia, this indicator was also evaluated as 
having no basis for administering Structural Funds. 
 
Table 4:  Horizontal and Vertical Assessment by Countries (5 CEECs) 
 










Horizontal Assessment           
Management  B B C  B C 
Programming  B B D  B B 
Implementation  C C  C  C C 
Vertical Assessment         
Structures (max.19)  B (16) B  (15) B  (15) A  (18) B  (14) 
Human Resources (max.17)  C (13)  C (12)  D (7)  C (14)  C (10) 
Systems & Tools (max.10)  C (6)  C (5) D  (4)  C (6)  C (5) 
Functioning (max. 18)  A (16) C  (12) D  (8) B  (13) C  (12) 
Notes: 
•  A: Overall Strong Capacity: ready for Structural Funds 
•  B: Overall Sufficient Capacity, but certain weaknesses to be addressed 
•  C: Not yet Sufficient Capacity, various and serious weaknesses to be addressed 
•  D: Insufficient Capacity, no basis for administering the Funds  
Source: own estimations   23
 
Of all five countries only Hungary and Estonia scored one A, each. These two countries succeeded to 
obtain three Bs and three Cs. On average, Hungary and Estonia can be seen as able to administer 
Structural Funds sufficiently, however, with certain weaknesses. The Czech Republic and Slovenia 
scored very similar results, with the Czechs being slightly better in Management. Various, serious 
weaknesses have to be addressed in these countries. With four Ds and only one B, Slovakia’s 
administration is not yet sufficiently prepared for the Structural Funds’ management and 
implementation. 
 
We must be aware that the situation evaluated here relates mainly to the picture in April 2003 and, for 
Slovenia, in September 2003. Therefore, for most countries we should hope that the European 
Commission’s comments and recommendations have, in the meantime, led to an improvement of the 
administrative situation.  
 
We also strongly believe that all countries in the sample will meet the legal requirements related to 
Chapter 21 - Structural and Cohesion Policy by the time of their official accession in May 2004. 
However, we do not believe that the administrations in Slovakia and Slovenia, being the countries 
recording poorest administrative capacity in our Case Study, will manage to be equipped in a way that 
would satisfy formal criteria of the European Commission. According to the present administrative 
situation presented in this paper, Slovenia and Slovakia, respectively, will have to make a lot of 




A country’s administrative structure is definitely among the strongest criteria to be taken into account 
when dealing with Structural Funds’ management. All procedures for managing and implementing 
Structural Funds are often long, cumbersome and demanding on human resources which at the end 
often gives rise to complaints such as: ‘Structural Fund subsidies are not worth the effort’. At the 
same time, successful execution of the EU’s Structural Policy depends on these processes and, 
consequently, the success of national development policy. The call for improvements is particularly 
strong at the end of a respective programming period. However, the Commission also emphasises that 
the complexity of management is common to both the Member States and the Commission itself. 
Improvement is therefore only possible by means of close co-operation. (see e.g. European 
Commission, 2002d, and 2003). 
 
The Candidate Countries did not have an opportunity to contribute to the discussion on the reform of 
Structural Funds in 1999, but had to adopt a totally new 2000-2006 system, even significantly 
different from the Pre-accession ones. Therefore, the new Member States had to accept the ‘state of 
the art’ of the 2000-2006 Structural Funds implementation rules. Here, the role of the European 
Commission was to strongly push these countries to follow the General Regulations for Structural 
Funds as strictly as possible and to thereby increase their administrative absorption capacity. 
Accordingly, we may expect that differences in managing Structural Funds from country to country 
will only be small in the Candidate Countries in 2004-2006.  
 
At the beginning of our discussion regarding absorption in the CEECs we emphasised our belief that 
the key indicators developed and tested here have proven to be an appropriate tool for presenting the 
administrative capacity of a particular Candidate Country at a certain point of time. Therefore, there is 
no doubt that this methodology should be further developed and also used in future studies when 
analysing the situation in Member States. In the following pages we make some observations and 
present some critical thoughts that may improve this methodology. 
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As mentioned, were we to take data for this paper from the start of 2004 and not from the second half 
of 2003 as we did, we would surely register additional progress in institution-building in the Candidate 
Countries and would – most probably – calculate better administrative capacities. Therefore, we 
believe such a paper should have been executed in future Member States already in time when the first 
increase in financial allocations for pre-accession funds in 2000 was executed, as well as at the start of 
2002. This would definitely help in the framework of negotiating financial chapters with the Candidate 
Countries. For the Commission, this would enable the allocation of much more funding for 
investments with higher absorption potential, as well as the concentration of investments mainly 
around institution-building. 
 
Today, we can only speculate about how good or bad the administrative absorption capacities are in 
the Candidate Countries and, consequently, about the threat of underspending the financial resources 
allocated from the Structural Funds. Moreover, we believe that even in the 2004-2006 period most 
Candidate Countries might achieve a score of B when measuring their respective administrative 
capacities, showing this period is in fact merely yet another transitional period for these countries.  
 
We have shown in our paper that no empirical studies were done with the main aim to look at the 
absorption capacities of the Structural Funds. Only in 1997 did the Commission support the first study 
to mainly stress the economic views of the problem and concentrate on issues related with the big 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund transfers to economic infrastructure. 
 
Therefore, it is very interesting to analyse the administrative capacity of Member States before their 
accession to the EU. Unfortunately, this is very hard to do ex-post. However, in many ways the 
adjustment problems these countries are facing are no different from those which troubled and still 
trouble certain Mediterranean regions of the EU and, in particular, Greece (see Papadopoulos, 2003: 
40).  
These problems appear to have grown significantly as the various aid interventions moved from 
relatively simple structures and procedures to an increasingly integrated and more complicated 
approach. Both the civil and private sector had to be flexible enough to adapt very quickly to the 
reforms of the Structural Funds that occurred before each new programming period. After all, an 
inefficient civil sector is one of the main factors of underdevelopment and vice versa. However, 
progress in the field of upgrading administrative capacity due to the EU’s Structural Policy may 
perhaps be the most significant indirect long-term benefit of the EU’s interventions in EU Cohesion 
Countries and, in the future, in the new Member States. 
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MA + PA 
 
Total  
SF-IBs  CSF/SPD OPs 
 
PA 
ERDF HRD Agri Reg. 
Planned  1,967 236 1,731  81 107  48  798  303  360  270 
Present  1,396 165 1,231  68 66  31  560  155  360  156 
HU 
%  71 70 71 84 62  65  70  51  100  58 
Planned  672 265 407 69
(1) 158  38 249 91 n.a.  67 
Present  361 111 250 23
(1)  69 19  203  28  n.a. 19 
CZ 
%  54 42 61 33 44  50  81  31  n.a.  28 
Planned  424 142 282 63
(1) 56  23  183 68 31 - 
Present  189 66 123  18
(1) 34  14 81  20 22 - 
SK 
%  45 46 44 29  61  61 44  29 71 - 
Planned  532 28 639 
(504) 






Present  365 22 463 
(343) 





%  69 79 72 
(68) 





Planned  102  37  65  18  19 26  29 10 - 
Present  65 28 37  12  16  12  15  10  - 
SLO 
(4) 
%  64 76 57  67 84  46  52  100  - 
 
 
Sources: Q-HU (2003), Q-CZ (2003), Q-SK (2003), Q-EE (2003), Q-SI (2003), SI Proposal (2003), 
own calculations. 
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Annex 2:  Key indicators, Sub-Indicators and their scoring for 5 CEECs 
Annex 2; Table 1: Key indicator: Management and related Sub-Indicators 
  Managing Authorities 




















HU  8 70%  (5)  6  2 5  21 
CZ  8 42%  (4)  5  2 3  18 
SK  8 46%  (6)  3  2 2  15 
EE  8 79%  (5)  7  2 4  21 
SLO  8 76%  (5)  4  2 3  17 
Notes: 
(1) The results of staffing of the MAs represent combined results (number of points in bold) of our 
calculations from Table HR (percentages) and our own evaluations (number of points in brackets) 
based on respective Questionnaires in accordance with methodology of NEI (2002a). The staff of 
respective Paying Authorities is also included. 
(2) Regarding the functioning of the Candidate Country’s civil service, its remuneration levels being 
competitive with those in the private sector as well as the existence of a career track for the civil 
servants, the results were taken from Papadopoulos (2003a).  
 
Annex 2; Table 2: Key indicator: Programming and related Sub-Indicators 
  Programming 




















HU  3 2  2  5  12 
CZ  4 3  1  4  12 
SK  2 1  1  2  6 
EE  4 3  2  4  13 
SLO  4 3  1  4  12 
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Annex 2; Table 3: Key indicator: Implementation and related Sub-Indicators 
 
  Intermediate Bodies 























HU 5  71% (4) 5  2  82% (5) 6  18 
CZ 3  61% (4) 4  2  70% (6) 5   14 
SK 5  44% (3) 3  1  67% (4) 4  13 
EE
(3) 6  68% (3) 4  2  77% (4) 5  17 
SLO
(4) 3  57% (3) 3  2  76% (5) 5  13 
Notes: 
(1)The results of staffing of the IBs represent combined the results of Papadopoulos (2003a), Table 
HRD and own estimations based on respective Questionnaires. Results in percentages are from Table 
HRD. 
(2)Taken from Papadopoulos (2003a), Horvat (2004: Case Study 2) and European Commission 
(2003c, Annex). Results in percentage are from Horvat (2004: Case Study 2, Table 3). 
(3)The staffing in the case of Estonia is without the staff of the Enterprise Estonia as Implementing 
Agency in the case of one ESF measure. This was done in order to avoid doubling.  
(4)Data for Slovenia are from September 2003 (SI Proposal, 2003). 
 
Sources: Papadopoulos (2003a), Q-HU (2003), Q-CZ (2003), Q-SK (2003), Q-EE (2003), Q-SI 
(2003), SI Proposal (2003), European Commission (2003c, Annex) own estimations. 
 
 
Explanatory Notes for the Tables of Annex 2 
 
Explanatory note for Management (Table 1) 
We can observe a relatively high score (6 points out of 7) for the staffing of MAs for Slovakia. The 
reason is that the Slovak Government was faced with the problem that individuals recruited and 
trained were later lost to the private sector where salaries are higher (see European Commission, 
2003c, Annex). To stop this process the Slovak government agreed to increase salaries for certain staff 
working on EU issues and by that made remuneration levels of those personnel competitive to those in 
the private sector. Therefore, despite the fact that the share of employed staff in MAs is below 50% of 
the planned level, the present staff is still well motivated. However, this is not the same when we look 
at the civil service in general. Here, Slovakia received only 2 points.   33
 
Explanatory notes for Programming (Table 2) 
 
Estonia 
Next to the Czech Republic and Slovenia, in Estonia a Strategic Environmental Assessment has also 
been prepared. This shows in the very good scoring in the column partnership. 
 
Slovenia 
Partnership; Slovenia prepared Strategic Environmental Assessment for the NDP and persistently 
dealt with this method also in the Ex-ante evaluation of the SPD. A Monitoring Committee for NDP 
was established already in 2001 and gradually developed in the framework of SPD preparations. 
Special attention of the Government has been given to involvement of the NGO sector in 
programming process by preparing various workshops and a special publication on the NGO sector 
(see CNVOS/REC; 2003). 
 
Hungary 
Regarding  partnership we took into account the representation of different interest groups in the 
Monitoring Committees. On the level of the CSF Monitoring Committee in Hungary there is no 
representative of the horizontal Community policies, but only one joint representative for minority 
(Roma) and equal opportunities interests. We believe that this is not sufficient representation. The 
same also applies to having only one representative of 7 regions. The number of economic and social 
partners is not explicitly provided. On the level of the OP Monitoring Committees more than one 
representative is foreseen for the horizontal issues and the regions. 
With regards to capacity for programming, our evaluation could only be based on the fact of existence 
of the provided strategic documents and their in-time submission to the Commission. Therefore, we 
took analytic and process skills as given and the expertise to create indicator system as missing. 
Because of delayed submission of the NDP and the Operational Programmes (planned by end-March, 
but submitted on 5 May 2003; see European Commission, 2003c, Annex) we gave no score for 
experience in programming for the capacity question.  
In its conclusions and recommendations to Hungary, the Commission encouraged Hungary to further 
strengthen its partnership process. We could not find any methods for creating partnership in the 
documents available.  
 
The Czech Republic 
Since the very beginning of NDP preparation the involvement of NGOs has been assured through the 
preparation of the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). Thereby, the partnership principle at 
the level of civil society, usually the part most lacking in the programming process, could be 
strengthened. This was the reason for such a high score. 
 
Slovakia 
Programming in Slovakia received the lowest total score (6 points out of 15). Since the NDP was 
largely prepared by a private consultancy company (see SK-NDP, 2003: 270) we can hardly speak of 
sufficient capacity – with analytic and process skills – to carry out programming. Some scepticism 
about ownership and real knowledge of the NDP has also been emphasised by the European 
Commission, especially because Programme Complements for Operational Programmes private 
consultants also seem to do the job. 
Low scores in partnership are due to the complaints of some regions and NGOs that they did not have 
enough information and were consulted late (see European Commission, 2003c, Annex). 
 
Explanatory notes for Implementation (Table 3) 
Hungary 
A list of intermediate bodies is available and IBs were assigned to individual measures, but they are 
neither well-regarded within their domain of work nor was an agreement from IBs obtained.    34
Staffing of IBs is still lacking further clarifications regarding their tasks and therefore we can also not 
claim that staffing is assured. However, in the case of IBs we do not see any particular obstacles to the 
securing of staffing when the tasks are clarified. 
Systems & Tools for project development process will be developed in the framework of the current 
SPP II Twinning arrangements. However, in April 2003 there were no coherent set of project selection 
criteria, no standardised application forms, nor a manual for compliance with EU legislation. 
Absorption of the Pre-accession funds can only be evaluated for the case of Phare funds, but not also 
for ISPA and SAPARD. In the Q-HU (2003) we could only read that implementation of the latter two 
programmes is on the way, therefore, we used the results of Papadopoulos (2003a) in the case of 
ISPA and SAPARD. For Phare, we used the results calculated in Horvat (2004; Case Study 2) herein. 
 
The Czech Republic 
Despite the fact that in the Czech Republic all IBs - with the exception of IBs for OP Agriculture – 
have been assigned to individual measures, we gave zero points for this question. Therefore, the whole 
indicator is relatively low.  
 
Slovakia 
In Slovakia there are also no written agreements yet between the MAs and IBs.  
The main problem with implementation of the future Slovak CSF with regard to the existing 
operational project development and project execution is the new formulation of regional bodies and 
Regional Development Agencies. Self-governing Regions have only existed in Slovakia since 2001 
and especially in the case of the OP Basic Infrastructure that is supposed to be implemented in the 
Regions this might cause problems in relation to absorption (see SK Negotiation Mandate, 2003: 8) 
 
Slovenia 
By the end of April 2003 in Slovenia the assignment of IBs was effected only at the level of Lead 
Ministries for each Structural Fund and no IBs (whatever their name might be: Implementing 
Authorities/Agencies or IBs as Activity Related Bodies) were specified below that level in the response 
to the Questionnaire (see Q-SI,  2003) nor in the latest draft SPD (see SI Response, 2003, and 
Slovenia SPD, 2003a). The number of staff was provided in September 2003, but not for all future IBs 
as Activity Related Bodies (see SI Proposal, 2003). 
   35
 
Annex 3:  Ranking by Horizontal and Vertical Assessment (5 CEECs) 
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10 – 13 
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•  A: Overall Strong Capacity: ready for Structural Funds 
•  B: Overall Sufficient Capacity, but certain weaknesses to be addressed 
•  C: Not yet Sufficient Capacity, various and serious weaknesses to be addressed 
•  D: Insufficient Capacity, no basis for administering the Funds  
 
Source: Papadopoulos (2003) for Horizontal assessment, own recalculations  for Vertical assessment  
 
 
 
 
 